Hybrid seals
Every attestation seal carries two signatures over the same record: a classical Ed25519 signature and a post-quantum ML-DSA-65 signature. Both must verify for the seal to count. A forger has to break both schemes, not one.
Keys, as built
The default service key is a 2-of-3 threshold with all three shares held server-side by JIL; there is no user-held shard, and authorizing a signature is not holding a key.
Status
Live: hybrid attestation seals on jil-mainnet-2. On chain, the Ed25519 half is verified and the ML-DSA-65 half is carried and anchored with the record. Live: validator signing with Ed25519 software keys. Designed: post-quantum validator signing, on-chain ML-DSA-65 verification, and a hardware security module for validator keys.
In practice
- Hybrid Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 on every attestation seal
- Upgradable module: hybrid dual-signature, then swap, then deprecation
- Validator keys are held in software today; the hardware security module path is on the roadmap
- 72-hour rotation target in production configurations
Questions people actually ask
Is JIL quantum-proof forever?
No system is. The design keeps an upgrade path and a short key lifetime so algorithms can move as the threat moves.
Does this replace Ed25519?
No. Hybrid means both signatures. Ed25519 keeps interoperability with existing verifiers, and ML-DSA-65 adds a lattice-based signature that a quantum computer is not known to break.
Keep reading
The white paper and a briefing are the next step if you are evaluating a domain.
