Consensus and fault model
| Action | Rule | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Block seal | Measured 2026-11-12, jil-mainnet-2 seals blocks with jil-abci-node under a third-party consensus engine. The image was created 2026-08-21. The signing set is eight, and a tip block sealed with six of those eight. The Attested Consensus Layer rule belongs to a separate binary that is not this process: six of ten with a verified enclave quote and a verified state-transition proof, eight of ten when those proofs are absent, and nine of ten when an inspection fails. Seven does not pass on that rule. | Live |
| Payment request | A request passes only when every active voting validator votes yes. A validator that does not answer within the round is not in the active voting set for that request. Silence is not a yes. One objection fails that request, the objection is recorded, and the chain continues. | Live |
| Bridge withdrawal | Agreement from every responding validator. The withdrawal path awaits a key ceremony. | Designed |
| Halt condition | Below seven voting validators, consensus stops. That is the only chain-level halt condition. | Live |
The engine is permissioned and single-operator, and makes no decentralization claim. A node that does not answer and a node that answers differently are different events: silence is tolerated, a contradiction is recorded and adjudicated. This is not Byzantine fault tolerance against the operator; the rule bounds accident and partial compromise.
Measured figures
| Measurement | Result | Date |
|---|---|---|
| jil-mainnet-2 | Eight in the signing set. Ten hosts. Height 118,023. | Genesis 2026-08-21. Height read 2026-11-12. |
| Cell density | 2,061 cells on a 96-core host; 1,074 on a 48-core host. Single-validator chains, no transactions. A floor. | 2026-08-27 |
| Pure core | About 3,100 lines. Compiled with no clock, no network, and no entropy; linked to WebAssembly with an empty import section. | 2026-08-27 |
| Throughput, block time, finality time | Not published. Roadmap item G5. |
Cryptography and execution
| Area | What is used | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Validator signing | Ed25519 software keys | Live |
| Attestation seals | Hybrid Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65; both must verify. On chain, the Ed25519 half is verified. | Live |
| Post-quantum validator signing | ML-DSA, with on-chain verification | Designed |
| Ruling commitment | SHA-256 | Live |
| Execution | No general-purpose virtual machine. Instruments are Currency Objects with mint, circulate, and redeem state machines and exactly-once replay slots. Not EVM-compatible. | Live |
| Finality | Cryptographic finality on the seal. A corridor hop finalizes after the release authorization and the arrival determination both complete. | Live |
Assurance plan
- Reproducible builds (G1), an external audit of the pure core and a non-customer verifier (G2), load on a production-shaped chain (G5), and a second independent implementation (G10) are on the roadmap. No dates are published.
- Johanson Group LLP is examining SOC 2 Type 1, SOC 2 Type 2, and HIPAA. No report has been issued.
Validators, exit, and cost
| Topic | Answer |
|---|---|
| Who runs the validators | JIL, all ten. Sovereign-hosted validators are on the roadmap. See control and custody. |
| Exit and portability | Participants keep access to their transaction and attestation records, and attestation evidence is portable. Ledger and key exit terms are set in each license. |
| Cost | Setup $100,000 one time and an annual floor of $250,000, credited against JIL's share of collected transport fees, for Domain or Hub. The toll is a minimum of 5 basis points per hop. See fees. |
Send your engineers
A technical briefing goes into the consensus code, the seal path, and the ruling.
