Every capability, one marker
Live means running on jil-mainnet-2 or on this site. Built means the code is merged and tested and is not the process sealing blocks. Designed means written down and on the roadmap. Assurance rows state the examination stage instead.
| Capability | Status | As of | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consensus: block seal | Live | 2026-11-12 | Measured 2026-11-12. The chain is producing blocks with jil-abci-node under a third-party consensus engine. The image was created 2026-08-21. The signing set is eight. A tip block sealed with six of those eight. The Attested Consensus Layer rule, six of ten with verified proofs, eight of ten without them, nine of ten when an inspection fails, is not the process on these hosts. |
| Consensus: payment request | Live | 2026-11-09 | Every active voting validator must vote yes. One objection fails that request; the chain continues. |
| Validator hosts | Live | 2026-11-12 | JIL operates all ten hosts. Measured 2026-11-12, eight are in the signing set. Two hosts are not on that tip. One stopped on 2026-11-03. One is at a block from 2026-10-12. One hosting provider. A zone name is a label, not a location. |
| Sovereign domains and the tier model | Live | 2026-11-09 | Reference domains run as demonstrations. Depth is root, hub, annex. |
| Corridors | Live | 2026-11-09 | Dual-signed, replay-protected, checked on departure and on arrival. Pinned hub key. |
| ATCE ruling on every transfer | Built | 2026-11-12 | The rule that no transfer moves outside an ATCE ruling was committed on 2026-11-01. It is not in the validator image created 2026-08-21. That image can deny a crossing. |
| Both-counterparty rule | Live | 2026-11-09 | The ruling reads the identity record, zone, and freeze state of both accounts. |
| Attested identity records and the attester | Live | 2026-11-09 | The attester signs KYC or KYB results into on-chain identity records. A holder-supplied context is ignored. |
| Sanctions in the ruling | Live | 2026-11-09 | The ruling denies on the attested sanctions flag. The screen against live lists runs off chain in the attester. |
| Per-asset limits | Live | 2026-11-09 | A domain default plus per-asset overrides. |
| Agentic review | Live | 2026-11-09 | Hold only. It can hold an act the rules passed. It cannot release a denial. |
| Ruling hash and record writer | Live | 2026-11-09 | Each ruling has a unique SHA-256 hash. The writer files the record under it; the chain references it. |
| Production write-once record store | Designed | 2026-11-09 | Provider, lock mode, residency, and erasure policy are set per domain at licensing. An Object Lock test bucket exists. |
| 10 years of retention | Designed | 2026-11-09 | Ten years from creation, with storage allocated per domain when its license is signed. |
| Currency Objects | Live | 2026-11-09 | Native managed instruments with solvency checks. Issuance disabled until a licensing event. |
| Hybrid attestation seals | Live | 2026-11-09 | Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65; both must verify. On chain, the Ed25519 half is verified. |
| Post-quantum validator signing | Designed | 2026-11-09 | Validator keys signing with ML-DSA, with on-chain ML-DSA verification. |
| Hardware security module for validator keys | Designed | 2026-11-09 | Validator keys are Ed25519 software keys today. |
| Ethereum bridge: deposit | Live | 2026-11-09 | Has run in production. |
| Ethereum bridge: withdrawal | Designed | 2026-11-09 | Awaits a key ceremony. |
| Other chains, stablecoins, and payment rails | Designed | 2026-11-09 | Listed networks, not connections. See known networks. |
| InterOp router | Designed | 2026-11-09 | Plans and runs multi-hop paths, a ruling per hop. |
| Negotiated per-hop rates | Designed | 2026-11-09 | The published minimum is 5 basis points. See fees. |
| Setup portal | Designed | 2026-11-09 | Shown as a demonstration. |
| Customer-hosted cell | Designed | 2026-11-09 | The runbook exists. |
| Sovereign-hosted validators | Designed | 2026-11-09 | See control and custody. |
| Proof DEX | Built | 2026-11-09 | Ring-fenced pools and ProofGuard. Nothing is listed. |
| On-chain governance | Built | 2026-11-09 | Parameter changes by proposal and vote inside consensus. |
| CourtChain evidence anchoring | Live | 2026-11-09 | Verify links on anchored evidence. |
| SOC 2 Type 1, SOC 2 Type 2, HIPAA | In examination | 2026-11-09 | Johanson Group LLP is examining SOC 2 Type 1. Trust Services Criteria in that examination are Security only. No report has been issued. SOC 2 Type 2 and the HIPAA examination are not started. |
| HITRUST | In engagement | 2026-11-09 | No HITRUST external assessor is engaged and no HITRUST report has been issued. |
Measured figures
| Measurement | Result | Date |
|---|---|---|
| jil-mainnet-2 | Eight validators in the signing set at height 118023. Ten hosts. Two are not on this tip. | Measured 2026-11-12. Genesis 2026-08-21. |
| Cell density, 96-core host | 2,061 cells at saturation, measured on single-validator chains with no transactions. A floor, not a capacity promise. | 2026-08-27 |
| Cell density, 48-core host | 1,074 cells at the ceiling, same method. | 2026-08-27 |
| Pure consensus core | About 3,100 lines, inside an eleven-crate Ring 0 of 52,447 lines. | 2026-08-27 |
| Throughput, block time, finality time, uptime | Not published. Load on a production-shaped chain is roadmap item G5. | |
| Public scale register | About 2.8 million lines of authored source, 350 or more services, 177 patent claims filed (patent pending, none granted), 9 trademarks filed (none registered). Source: /metrics.json. | 2026-09-03 |
Roadmap
Roadmap items carry no dates, because no date is published.
| Item | What it delivers | Status |
|---|---|---|
| G1 Reproducible builds | Separates a differing build from a failing machine. | Designed |
| G2 External audit of the pure core, then a non-customer verifier | An independent check of the correctness argument. | Designed |
| G3 Ruling on every transfer | The every-transfer rule was committed on 2026-11-01 and is not in the 2026-08-21 validator image. That image can deny a crossing. | Built |
| G4 Hardware security modules and post-quantum validator signing | Closes the classical-signature window, with on-chain ML-DSA verification. | Designed |
| G5 Load on a production-shaped chain | Published throughput and latency under sustained traffic and aged state. | Designed |
| G6 Production record store | Provider, lock mode, residency, erasure policy. | Designed |
| G7 Sovereign-hosted validators | Removes dependence on one provider and one operator. | Designed |
| G8 InterOp | Router build one connector at a time, and the bridge withdrawal key ceremony. | Designed |
| G9 System-account custody and a divergence-certificate store | Published custody of system accounts. | Designed |
| G10 A second independent implementation | A clean-room implementation that does not share the first one's bugs. | Designed |
Detail pages
The ATCE section keeps its own capability-level detail on the ATCE status ledger. Where the two differ, this page is current. The white paper states the architecture.
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